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ABSTRACT: This paper aims at combining diﬀerent theoretical and methodological
approaches for the analysis of discourse, focusing in particular on argumentative struc-
tures. At a ﬁrst level an attempt is made to include argumentation in critical discourse
analysis in order to extend the analysis of interaction between ‘‘structures of discourse’’
and ‘‘structures of ideologies’’ to higher levels of language description. At a second level
the study will integrate the qualitative approaches of critical discourse analysis and
argumentation theory with the quantitative tools of corpus linguistics, so that the analysis
can be carried out on a representative amount of texts and in a more systematic way. Even
though corpus linguistics tends to be focused on meanings localized at the level of words,
while argumentative structures stretch out through longer units of text, an integration can
be attempted by circumscribing the enquiry to those aspects of argumentation which are
signalled by indicators, and are therefore electronically retrievable. In particular, this
paper investigates the use of dissociation and presupposition in a corpus of newspaper
articles published in the run up to the war on Iraq. Both structures respond to retriev-
ability criteria while being powerful instruments to convey ideologically oriented
messages.
KEY WORDS: corpus linguistics, critical discourse analysis, dissociation, presupposi-
tion, press, war
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is part of a broader project, which explores the possibility
of combining the qualitative approach of critical discourse analysis
with the quantitative methodology of corpus linguistics. The aim is to
propose an integrated model of analysis which beneﬁts both from the
interest of CDA for the modalities through which language represents
and constructs reality, and from corpus linguistics’ concern for a rigor-
ous description of language, based on a representative sample of data.
In particular this paper will give an account of how presuppositions
and dissociations were used in the discourse of preparation to the war
on Iraq which took shape in the British1 press from January 2002,
Argumentation (2007) 21:361–378  Springer 2007
DOI 10.1007/s10503-007-9058-7
when Bush delivered his ‘‘axis-of-evil speech’’, to the outbreak of the
war itself, through the analysis of a corpus of newspaper articles2
which has been built for the purpose of this study.
The ﬁrst hypothesis for the present study is that the integrated
model I propose can be applied also to higher structures of discourse,
such as argumentative moves, which are not so often addressed by
CDA, notwithstanding declarations of intents, and even less by corpus
linguistics, due to the fact that the typical tools of such discipline are
thought to work at best on the level of words and grammar. The
choice of presuppositions and dissociations, among all the possible
argumentative aspects, is motivated by the fact that they are signalled
by words which act as indicators, and are thus retrievable using the
tools of corpus linguistics. The second hypothesis is that the occur-
rence of presuppositions and dissociations in a corpus might signal
controversial areas of discourse, where argumentative strategies are
more or less covertly used, and therefore worthy of closer qualitative
analysis.
2. MODEL
The rationale behind the original project results from a double inter-
est: on the one hand there was an epistemological interest for the
modalities through which the press represented the debate about the
possibility of a war on Iraq, in line with the scope of critical discourse
analysis; on the other hand the focus was methodological, and ad-
dressed the issue of how corpus linguistics could help to overcome the
limits of CDA, which were pointed out in several occasions by diﬀer-
ent scholars. One ﬁrst reason of complaint is that the strong political
commitment of critical discourse analysts, aimed at unveiling the role
of language in maintaining existing power relations to the advantage
of dominant groups, has a negative inﬂuence in terms of methodologi-
cal rigorousness (Widdowson, 1995). In particular, some interpreta-
tions of the texts are seen to rely more on an ideological basis than on
a sound linguistic analysis, and apart from that the relation between
discourse and grammar is often uncertain. The second reason concerns
the way texts are selected, which often translates into the fact that
analyses are carried out on small samples of text which are chosen ad
hoc, because they allow to demonstrate pre-constituted interpretative
views (Phillips, 1989, p. 8).
As suggested by seminal studies which advocated an integration of
qualitative and quantitative approaches (Hardt-Mautner, 1995; Stubbs,
1996; Garzone and Santulli, 2004), the integration of corpus linguistics
and CDA could solve both these problems, starting from criteria for
text selection. In the ﬁrst place, the sample of texts and the range of
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sources should be wide enough to be representative of a certain dis-
course type and the same is true for what concerns the range of sour-
ces. Second, when it comes to the analysis of the corpus proper, the
quantitative approach forces to a closer observation of data, with a
view to the frequency with which a certain characteristic occurs, so
that uses which can be identiﬁed as recurring are considered as more
relevant than isolated examples.
3. PRESUPPOSITION AND DISSOCIATIONS
The two structures which have been selected for analysis present a
twofold reason of interest. On the one hand, they add to the proposi-
tional content, which is explicitly expressed, an evaluative component,
which is not physically coded by language, but which is conveyed
thanks to the background knowledge and the beliefs shared by the
participants. More speciﬁcally, this added evaluative component re-
sults from the fact that the speaker implicitly attaches diﬀerent values
to related aspects, one being judged more positive or more relevant
than the other. Because it is formulated in such a covert way, this
form of evaluation is less likely to raise criticism on the part of the
reader, and has therefore a high potential for inﬂuencing public
opinion. With regard to this Thompson and Hunston (2001, p. 9)
state that ‘‘the less obtrusively the evaluation is placed in the clause,
the more likely it is to successfully manipulate the reader’’. On the
same topic, Ducrot (1972, p. 6)3, with reference to presupposition,
says:
Every explicit statement becomes, for the very fact of being explicit, an object of
possible discussion. All that is stated can be contradicted […]. The formulation of
an idea is the first and decisive step towards it being put into discussion.
On the other hand both presuppositions and dissociations can be
retrieved electronically within a corpus of large amounts of texts, be-
cause they are associated with speciﬁc indicators. Of course, the corre-
spondence between indicator and structure is not automatic, but the
output of a query can be scrolled manually, in order to retain only the
relevant occurrences. The discussion will now move on to deal with
each of the two structures.
3.1. Presupposition
A form of pragmatic inference, presupposition is deﬁned by Levinson
starting from the meaning the term is given in everyday language, that
is ‘‘any kind of background assumption against which an action, the-
ory, expression or utterance makes sense or is rational’’ (1983, p. 168).
In a ‘‘technical’’ sense, however, it is possible to talk of presupposition
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only in those cases in which inferences ‘‘seem at last to be built into
linguistic expressions4, and which can be isolated using speciﬁc linguis-
tic tests (especially, traditionally, ‘constancy under negation’)’’
(Ibidem).
To illustrate how presupposition works, Levinson quotes the exam-
ple ‘‘John managed to stop in time’’, which presupposes ‘‘John tried to
stop in time’’. As for the ‘‘constancy under negation’’ requisite, it is
satisﬁed when the presupposed information stays true even if the verb
is negated, as can be seen in the following example:
John didn’t manage to stop in time
 John tried to stop in time (Ibidem)
However, even if presuppositions are semantically triggered, their
meaning potential is not achieved just on the semantic level, but on
the contrary the context plays an important role, giving presupposi-
tions a pragmatic value. With reference to the previous example, the
presupposition is built into the word ‘‘manage’’, but it is the context,
for example the attribution of responsibility in a car accident, which
makes this statement relevant and evaluative. Stalkaner (1973, 2002),
among others, has emphasised the pragmatic nature, as opposed to the
semantic nature, of presupposition. Phenomena such as the well-
known ‘‘the present king of France is bald’’, which presupposes that
France has a king, are deﬁned in semantic terms as follows:
A sentence S presupposes that u if and only if S is either true or false only if it is
true that u.
On the other hand, according to Stalnaker presupposition should be
seen as a relation ‘‘between a speaker and a proposition’’ (1973,
p. 447) rather than as a relation between propositions themselves, as
entailed in the semantic deﬁnition. The important aspect is what the
speaker takes for granted when s/he uses certain sentences, the back-
ground of knowledge or beliefs which s/he thinks is shared by the par-
ticipants in the communicative exchange. From this perspective, a
better deﬁnition of presupposition could be as follows:
A speaker presupposes that P at a given moment in a conversation just in case he is
disposed to act, in his linguistic behaviour, as if he takes the truth of P for granted,
and as if he assumes that his audience recognizes that he is doing so (Stalnaker,
1973, p. 448).
The notion of ‘‘common ground’’ outlined in the deﬁnition above is
considered by Stalnaker the most prominent feature of presupposition
since, as he puts it, ‘‘one presupposes that u only if one presupposes
that others presuppose it as well’’ (Stalnaker, 2002, p. 701). As we will
see later in the section dedicated to the corpus analysis, it was this
purportedly shared common ground which was massively exploited in
the build up of a case for war.
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3.1.1 Presupposition analysis
Diﬀerent lists of indicators have been drawn, which can be used to
spot presuppositions in texts. The analysis of presuppositions in this
study was carried out starting form Levinson’s selection of ‘‘presuppo-
sition triggers’’ (1983, pp. 181–184), which is reported below, focusing
only on the ones which recurred more frequently in the corpus:
• Deﬁnite descriptions
• Factive verbs
• Implicative verbs
• Change of state verbs
• Iteratives
• Verbs of judging
• Temporal clauses
• Cleft sentences
• Implicit clefts with stressed constituents
• Comparisons and contrast
• Non restrictive relative clauses5
• Counterfactual conditionals
• Questions
The analysis of presuppositions that follows aims at understanding
what functions they perform in the discourse of preparation to war,
with reference to the Hallidayan categories of ideational, textual and
interpersonal meaning6 (1994). However, while presuppositions can be
found to work on all of the three levels, the most interesting uses con-
cern the codiﬁcation of stance on the level of interpersonal meaning,
which subsumes comments, attitudes and values expressed by the wri-
ter in the attempt to inﬂuence the reader.
The concept of presupposition has been integrated with notions of
evaluation theory (Thompson and Hunston, 2001), to make it more
suitable for the investigation of ideology in the texts. In particular the
analysis revolves around two parameters, one aﬀective, which assigns
value in terms of the ‘‘good-bad’’ polarization, the other epistemic,
concerning the degree of certainty attached by the speaker to the
propositional content of his/her message.
A ﬁnal preliminary remark needs to be made before passing on to
discuss the use of presupposition in the corpus. As mentioned before,
many of the articles taken in exam report – as is customary of media
discourse – oﬃcial speeches and statements. This presents the reader
with a double level of speakers and, of course, of arguers if some
form of argumentative discourse is going on. Since in some cases it
might not be clear from the examples who the arguer is, this will be
speciﬁed as follows: [S] for the source of the quotation and [J] for the
journalist.
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(i) Presuppositions with an aﬀective evaluative component: Evalua-
tion is expressed most obviously in those presuppositions triggered by
verbs with a clear negative connotation, such as verbs of judging.
Among these ‘‘accuse’’, some examples of which follow, is the one
which occurs most frequently in the corpus:
(1) Mr. Bush has accused Iran of trying to undermine the new regime in
Kabul and oﬀering a haven to ﬂeeing Taleban and al-Qaeda ﬁghters.
[S] Times
 undermining the new regime in Kabul is wrong
(2) Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, accused both the US and
Britain of failing to hand over intelligence on Iraq’s activities. [S] Guardian
 The US and Britain should hand over their intelligence on Iraq’s
activities.
(3) The oﬃcial accused the French and Germans of using tactics that
rendered Resolution 1441 ineﬀective. [S] Telegraph
 The French and Germans should commit themselves to implement
Resolution 1441
(4) Mr. Duncan Smith accused Europe of ‘‘gazing at its political navel’’
while its cities have been coming in range of Middle East missiles. He made
clear that a Conservative government would seek to join the United States
in developing a global missile defence system. [S] Telegraph
 Europe should not ‘‘gaze at its political navel’’
Apart from presuppositions triggered by explicitly evaluative judge-
mental verbs, other presuppositions have the eﬀect of expressing value
in a less direct way. This is the case when evaluation is not semanti-
cally contained in the trigger, but stems from larger stretches of text,
as in the following examples:
(5) Mr. Arafat had managed to enforce a ceaseﬁre for three weeks, but there
was no diplomatic action to shore it up, as international attention was
focused on the trouble in south Asia. [J] Telegraph
 he made an eﬀort to enforce a ceaseﬁre
(6) If the pressing concern of America and Britain is the threat posed by
Iraq’s secret eﬀorts to procure weapons of mass destruction, then a proper
course is still to demand the return of the UN weapons inspections regime.
Critics will argue that Saddam managed to hide large sections of his pro-
gramme from inspectors before they left in 1998. [S] Guardian
 Saddam pursued the aim of hiding large sections of his programme
As can be noticed from (5) and (6) the implicative verb ‘‘manage’’ is
neither negatively nor positively connotated in itself, but it takes on its
value from the negative connotation of the verb which follows. In (5)
the presupposition on the one hand can be seen as appreciatory of the
eﬀort made by Arafat, but on the other it casts a doubt as to his being
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in control of his people; in (6), since the action of hiding weapons pro-
gram from the UN inspectors is judged negatively, saying that Sad-
dam ‘‘managed’’ to do that simply adds a negative emphasis on his
actions.
(ii) Presuppositions with an epistemic evaluative component: The dis-
cussion will now move on to presuppositions with epistemic value,
which turned out to be the ones which were deployed most extensively
and with the most eﬀective results. Occurrences of epistemic evalua-
tion in the corpus can be mainly divided into two groups: on the one
hand those used to present allegation as evidence; on the other the
ones which present opinions and judgements as if they were commonly
accepted knowledge.
The presuppositions in the ﬁrst group are principally triggered by
factive verbs, verbs which indicate change of state, and iteratives. Here
are some examples of the former kind of verbs:
(7) A key question would be whether Saddam was aware of or had sanc-
tioned such a transfer. His special security organisation, run by his son
Qusay, has close control over concealed weapons programmes. [J] Tele-
graph
 there was a transfer
(8) Given the latest Bush projections last week – ‘‘we know that thousands
of trained killers are plotting to attack us’’ – he must surely have an even
more gargantuan cliche´ up his sleeve. [S] Independent
 there are thousands of trained killers ready to attack
(9) Tony Blair reinforced the message yesterday by telling the Commons:
‘‘We do know of links between al-Qaida and Iraq. We cannot be sure of the
exact extent of those links.’’ [S] Guardian
 there are links between al-Qaeda and Iraq.
(10) But we now know that since the departure of the inspectors in 1998,
Saddam has bought or attempted to buy specialised vacuum pumps of the
design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium. [S: Blair]
Times
 Saddam has bought (or tried to buy) vacuum pumps
In all these examples, the factive verb be aware/know presupposes
that the object of such knowledge does exist, be it the transfer of
weapons from Iraq to Al-Qaeda terrorists in (7), the plots of new at-
tacks in (8), the existence of links between Al-Qaeda and Saddam
Hussein in (9), or again the new nuclear programme in (10). However,
since they are presupposed, no evidence is put forth to support the
claim that all these threats are real. Very often discourses making a
case for war reported of intelligence which, for its own nature, could
not be fully disclosed: no source could be possibly revealed, and nei-
ther could the circumstances whereby the news was apprehended by
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the intelligence services. In these occasions the authoritativeness of the
speaker serves as the only guarantee for what is claimed, as is the case
in examples 8–10, where Bush or Blair seem to rely on the implicit
argument: ‘‘you can believe to what I’m saying because I am the presi-
dent, and I know for sure’’. A wider extract of Blair’s speech reported
in (10) will further illustrate this point:
(10a) Saddam’s previous nuclear weapons programme was shut down by
the inspectors, following disclosure by defectors of the full, but hidden,
nature of it. That programme was based on gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment. The known remaining stocks of uranium are now held under
supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency. But we now know
that since the departure of the inspectors in 1998, Saddam has bought or
attempted to buy specialised vacuum pumps of the design needed for the
gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line
of the speciﬁcation for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges;
dual use products, such as anhydrous hydrogen ﬂuoride and ﬂuoride gas,
which can be used both in petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades;
a ﬁlament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon-ﬁbre
gas centrifuge rotors; and has attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more
specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to strict controls due to their
potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges. In addition, we know
Saddam has been trying to buy signiﬁcant quantities of uranium from
Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful. [S]
Whereas past events concerning WMD are documented through sound
verifiable evidence – the previous program was shut down by inspectors and
the remaining stocks of uranium are now held under the supervision of the
International Atomic Energy Agency –, when it comes to the supposed ‘‘new
programme’’, all we are given is a cascade of equipment names (in italics),
which would allegedly serve the purpose of enriching uranium. As for the
evidence of these new findings, all the epistemic certainty derives from the
expression ‘‘but we now know’’.
All these examples contain a fallacy, which consists in the fact that
the standpoint that Saddam possesses such weapons is not defended
properly. What is violated in this case is the rule7 of the ‘‘burden of
proof’’ (van Eemeren et al., 2002, p. 113) according to which ‘‘A party
who puts forward a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked to do
so’’. In political discourse, where no real dialogic exchange is going
on, the condition ‘‘if asked to do so’’ should be implicit, since the aim
of the speaker is necessarily to inﬂuence public opinion and the nature
of communication is therefore argumentative. As for the modalities
through which such a rule can be violated, in the examples above the
burden of proof is avoided by giving one’s authority as a guarantee of
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truthfulness, rather than supporting the standpoint with evidence
(ivi, p. 116).
Still in relation with Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, predicates of change give rise to presuppositions which represent
another kind of fallacy, namely violation of the starting point rule, as
explained by van Eemeren et al. (2002, p. 129):
The protagonist violates rule 6 [starting point rule] if he acts as though a certain
proposition was accepted as a starting point when that is not the case. A familiar
trick for preventing a proposition from being attacked is to formulate something
controversial in such an inconspicuous way that it is not noticed. This can be done
by presenting the controversial proposition as a presupposition (an assumption tac-
itly assumed by the speaker) of another statement […]
In the following examples, the verb ‘‘stop’’ presupposes that the ac-
tion referred to is actually under way, considering the ‘‘reality’’ of it as
an accepted starting point, be it the possession of WMD by what
Bush deﬁned ‘‘rogue states’’ (11, 13, 14) or the relation between ‘‘Pal-
estinians’’ and terrorism (12):
(11) The Bush team is convinced that only the removal of Saddam himself
can stop his obsessive eﬀorts to accumulate lethal agents. [S] Telegraph
 Saddam is accumulating lethal agents
(12) The second is that the Palestinians must stop encouraging terrorism.
This is especially horrifying when it is carried out by teenage girls on a
suicide mission. [J] Independent
 the Palestinians encourage terrorism
(13) But this morning Mr. Bush said the three nations must stop developing
biological, chemical and possibly nuclear weapons or risk US action. [S]
Times
 the three nations are developing biological, chemical and possibly nu-
clear weapons
(14) He also wants to stop Iran from funneling arms to terrorists, and seek
to prevent North Korea from developing and selling missiles. [S: Bush]
Guardian
 Iraq funnels arms to terrorists
The same fallacy is generated in presuppositions triggered by itera-
tives, as exempliﬁed by the following occurrences of the verb
‘‘continue’’:
(15) He needs to continue to make the case for confronting Saddam and
eradicating every part of his infrastructure for weapons of mass destruc-
tion. [J] Times
(16) My nation will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their
responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the
conﬂict. [S: Bush] Telegraph
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(17) A White House source declined to comment on the draft report in
detail, but said: ‘‘In general, we have conﬁdence that Mr. Blix will continue
to back our view that Saddam has co-operated on process but not on
substance. [S] Telegraph
In (15) it is presupposed that Blair (‘‘He’’) has been making the case
for war, whereas one of the leitmotifs in the British press at that time
was the lack of a clear ‘‘casus belli’’; in (16) Bush uses a presupposi-
tion to present his foreign policy as equidistant from Palestine and Is-
rael, which is in fact quite disputable, having in several occasion
shown a closer bondage with Israel, also in the name of a common
ﬁght to terrorism; in the same way, in (17) Blix’s communality of
opinion with the White House is presupposed as an accepted starting
point, whereas the UN Chief Inspector has always highlighted the po-
sitive aspect of Iraq’s moves of cooperation.
As already pointed out, a second group of presuppositions which
can be included under the label of epistemic evaluation presents opin-
ions and judgements as if they were common knowledge. This is best
exempliﬁed by the cases where the verb ‘‘know’’ is associated with a
plural ﬁrst person pronoun, which includes the reader, as in the fol-
lowing examples:
(18) Mr. Blair told the committee: ‘‘We know perfectly well, I think most of
us, that what he said in his declaration of December 8 is not true. [S]
Independent
(19) We all know that New Labour is obsessed with manipulation of the
news and of its own image. [J] Telegraph
(20) Most Americans know that the administration is acting with moral and
historical responsibility. [S] Guardian
In all these cases what is presented as a belief accepted by most
people is in fact potentially controversial and far from undisputable.
This is demonstrated by the fact that in some of the examples above
the purpose is highly polemical since they point out diﬀerent views
shared by competing parties: ‘‘we’’ versus Saddam regime in (18), con-
servatives and labourists in (19), and more implicitly groups with dif-
ferent positions as to the US Administration in (20).
In this way what is violated is the rule of argumentation scheme,
according to which a standpoint may not be regarded as conclusively
defended if the defence does not take place by means of an appropri-
ate argument scheme that is correctly applied (van Eemeren et al.,
2002, p. 130).
In particular the violation consists in the use of the ad populum
argument, the implication of which is that a standpoint should be con-
sidered valid simply because many people agree with it, thus running
the risk of falling into pure demagogy (ivi, p. 131).
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3.2. Dissociation
Originally studied by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) and more
recently by van Rees (2002, 2005) dissociation is an argumentative
scheme in which the speaker ‘‘separates elements that previously were
considered by the auditorium as a whole or a conceptual unit’’ (van
Rees, 2005, p. 53). In a more extended deﬁnition, which highlights its
functional aspect, van Rees (2005, p. 54) explains dissociation as an:
[…] argumentative technique that serves to resolve the contradictions that a notion
that originally was covered by a single term and that was considered a unity, gives
rise to. Dissociation resolves these contradictions by distinguishing various aspects
within that notion, some of which are subsumed under a new denominator. The
now reduced old notion and the new notion that has been split off are not equally
valued, one is considered more important and more central than the other; therein
lies the source of argumentative potential of the technique.
Through a comparison with similar techniques, such as semantic
shift, distinction and precisation, van Rees (2005, p. 64) draws three
conditions which have to be met in order to identify an argumentative
move as dissociation:
1. from an existing conceptual unit, expressed by a single term, one or more aspects
are split off; 2. through this operation a contradiction or paradox is resolved be-
cause now a proposition can be considered true in one interpretation of the original
term and false in the other; 3. the reduced and the split off concept are assigned a
different value.
On the basis of these features, van Rees ﬁnds some possible indica-
tors of dissociation, which can be identiﬁed as clues of separation,
with reference to feature 1, clues of negation, in touch with feature 2
and reference to a value scale, according to feature 3. The ﬁrst group
includes words and expressions that signal a distinction or a form of
precization, such as ‘‘distinction’’, ‘‘diﬀerence’’, ‘‘not the same as’’,
‘‘something else than’’, ‘‘except’’, ‘‘precizate’’ etc. The second group
entails all the indicators of opposition, and most notably the negative
adverb ‘‘not’’, in particular when associated with the conjunction
‘‘but’’. Indicators of the third group, ﬁnally, point to a diﬀerent value
attribution to the two elements which result from the dissociation of
the former uniﬁed concept. These include words which can be referred
to value scales such as ‘‘essential-incidental’’, ‘‘central-peripheral’’,
‘‘real-pseudo’’, etc. In some cases the dissociation is performed explic-
itly, while in others a part of the process remains unexpressed and is
taken as a ‘‘self evident starting point’’ (ibidem).
In real use, however, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly
whether dissociation is originated by a process of separation, negation
or attribution of diﬀerent values on a given scale, as it is often the
case that more than one process is in progress. Therefore, even though
the cases of dissociation which follow were retrieved in the corpus
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starting from indicators of the three groups8, the discussion will not be
organised on the basis of the type of indicator. Instead, examples will
be grouped together on the basis of patterns of meaning which a data
driven analysis has revealed as being recurrent.
3.2.1 Analysis of dissociations in the corpus
Two main uses of dissociation emerge from the corpus: a polemical
use aimed at presenting this war as anomalous in various respects, and
a defensive use adopted by those who are against it in order to defend
their position from the attacks of war supporters. For what concerns
the ﬁrst group, an example can be found in the following fragment:
(21) Why won’t the Government tell us whether it thinks military action
against Iraq would be lawful in the absence of an explicit resolution from
the United Nations Security Council? Tony Blair and his ministers have
repeatedly said anything they may do will be in accordance with interna-
tional law. That sounds reassuring, but only until you remember that
international law is not like other law. As Ross Cranston, an academic
lawyer and former Labour law oﬃcer, said in the Commons this week:
‘‘One of the diﬃculties with international law, as opposed to domestic
law, is that no body has jurisdiction over the whole range of issues.’’
[J] Telegraph
The speaker separates international law from other law assigning a
diminished value to the former to demonstrate that Blair’s words can-
not be reassuring. The speaker’s implicit standpoint is that in his opin-
ion, the British premier would be ready to back a US war even
without a UN resolution, and this would be illegal. Blair’s statement
that any action would be in accordance with International law seems
to be in contradiction with the speaker’s standpoint, but the dissocia-
tion allows to solve this problem, by presenting international law as
defective: if normally the fact that an action abides by a law can be
seen as a guarantee of its equity, this is not the case with international
law.
In the following example the explicit opposition these times – nor-
mal times points to a more indirect opposition, concerning the UN
draft resolution about Iraq:
(22) The draft resolution goes further than previous UN directives in
imposing the kind of intrusive rules, regulations and timetables that any
sovereign nation, in normal times, would reject out of hand. The US, for
example, has stubbornly resisted international inspections of its biological
weapons facilities. Israel, for example, has unknown, undeclared stockpiles
of weapons of mass destruction. But these are not normal times.
[J] Guardian
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In this case it is more diﬃcult to spot a dissociative move, because
most of the reasoning is implicit. The focus of discussion is on the
draft resolution and indirectly on its eﬀects in terms of the possible
Iraqi reaction. It is foreseen that Saddam’s reaction will not be of
compliance, but the position of the speaker is that he can’t be blamed
for that. This could give rise to a contradiction, because in Western
democracies it is customary to believe that not complying with UN
resolutions is wrong. However this is resolved by separating this reso-
lution, which is the output of ‘‘these times’’, from the resolutions of
‘‘normal times’’: while in normal times resolutions respect national
sovereignty, in this case it imposes rules, regulations and timetables
that any sovereign nation would normally reject, therefore it cannot be
expected that Iraq will be an exception.
In a similar way, also the next fragment presents the contemporary
situation as anomalous, and therefore as requiring new measures:
(23) The Divisional Court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider
the issue of international law. It was plainly correct to do so as a matter of
constitutional law. As pointed out by Lord Justice Simon Brown (with
whomMr. Justice Maurice Kay andMr. Justice Richards agreed), it is well-
established that the courts will not declare the meaning of an international
agreement that is not part of domestic law. On the basis of high judicial
authority, the Divisional Court had no choice but to reject the CND claim.
But should the courts refuse to entertain such a complaint? The Divi-
sional Court gave three main reasons why the courts decline to be involved,
none of them very persuasive. The ﬁrst was the evidence from the Foreign
Oﬃce that if the Government were obliged to answer international law
arguments, it may undermine the prospects of a diplomatic solution to the
crisis, ‘‘damage our relations with the US’’ and ‘‘give comfort to the
Iraqis’’. But the Government would be responding on issues of law, not
policy or strategy.
The Divisional Court’s refusal to consider the substance of the case was
correct on the existing precedents. But it is time for legal policy to be
reconsidered. [J] Times
With reference to the conclusion of the Divisional Court that ‘‘it
had no jurisdiction’’ to express itself on the lawfulness of a war on
Iraq without a UN resolution, the dissociation, is performed by sepa-
rating the notion of ‘‘correct on the existing precedents’’ from the no-
tion of uncompromisingly ‘‘correct’’, where clearly the newly separated
notion is assigned a diminished value. In this way the speaker can ar-
gue that the decision of the court was not the best, even if it was in
accordance with the law, while at the same time he advocates a change
in the current legislation, motivated by the changes in the international
political situation.
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The next fragment presents another anomalous aspect related to the
war on Iraq, that is the nature of the ‘‘new’’ terrorism, and two disso-
ciative moves:
(24) Not only is the message not getting across, but there seems to be a
fundamental misunderstanding of where the real sophistication of Jihad
International comes from. It is not in its ingenious and despicable skill in
butchering innocent civilians, or even in its apparently formidable organ-
isational skills, which in reality may be far less formidable than assumed,
but in syndicating and marketing its brand of terror. This is not the old
terrorism of the IRA or ETA, with structures, doctrines and pseudo-mil-
itary organisation. What Bush and Blair and all their allies do not
understand is that it is the idea of al- Qaeda, not its physical reality, that is
the key, an idea which has taken deep root in countries from Afghanistan
to South East Asia and Africa. [J] Guardian
First of all, the expressions ‘‘misunderstanding’’ and ‘‘real sophisti-
cation’’ are indicators of a process of dissociation. Since it cannot be
denied that ingeniousness and skill in the preparation of attacks are
among the characteristics of al-Qaeda, the speaker, who wants to
make the point that something else, i.e. the ability in ‘‘marketing its
brand of terror’’, is at the basis of the terrorist organization’s ‘‘suc-
cess’’, distinguishes ‘‘real sophistication’’ from a more marginal kind
of sophistication. A second dissociation reinforces the speaker’s line of
argument: the previously uniﬁed concept of al-Qaeda is split oﬀ into
two new concepts, its physical reality, and its idea. In this way, it can
be argued without contradiction that the widespread conception about
al-Qaeda, shared by Bush, Blair and all their allies, is right if limited
to the organization’s physical reality, while it does not seize the real
force of the organization, which lies in its idea and which is well roo-
ted in many countries.
As mentioned before, a second pattern related to dissociation re-
veals that this technique is used with a defensive function, to negate
that one party’s position is in some way contradictory, as suggested by
the other party. In particular this form of dissociation was exploited
by those who were against the war, but did not want to be seen as
supporters of the Iraqi regime, as in the next example:
(25) In yesterday’s speech Mr. Blair widened his case in an attempt to
appease rebellious members of his party. As well as making the familiar
global arguments about the need to disarm Saddam, he put the moral
‘‘progressive’’ arguments for the removal of the Iraqi regime. This was the
clearest sign that Mr. Blair is rattled by the scale of the internal opposition.
He cited the atrocities committed by Saddam and warned of the potential
horrors if there were no war against Iraq. The Independent on Sunday is a
progressive newspaper, but we do not accept this argument as a justiﬁcation
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for a pre-emptive strike against another country. As we have argued for
several months, President Bush and Mr. Blair have to convince voters that
Iraq poses a real and immediate threat. Their failure to do so is the reason
why Mr. Blair faces the biggest political crisis of his career. [J] Independent
In this case a double use of implicit dissociation is made. On the
one hand Blair’s recourse to the ‘‘moral progressive argument’’ for the
removal of Saddam Hussein relies on a submerged dissociation. Con-
fronted by his own party’s opposition, Blair ﬁnds himself in the poten-
tially contradictory position of being progressive and being at the
same time in favour of a war. By means of an implicit dissociation he
can defend war for humanitarian reasons and reject ‘‘oﬀensive’’ wars
thus staying true to progressive values. At the same time Blair seems
to imply that those who claim to be progressive but are not ready to
defend the human rights of the Iraqi people are not really progressive.
On the other hand, the Independent on Sunday defends itself from such
an accusation by separating the notion of ‘‘accepting the progressive
argument for a pre-emptive war’’ from the notion of ‘‘being progres-
sive’’, which allows them to reject the former and assert the latter.
In a similar way, the next fragment can be seen as an attempt to
escape a polarizing argument:
(26) No doubt there are some abroad who support Saddam, others who are
neutral and others who want to see him go but do not think an American war
is the way to do it. [J] Guardian
Here the Guardian is making the point that there is no contradiction
in being against Saddam and at the same time against a war on Iraq.
Implicitly the writer splits oﬀ the concept of a dictator’s removal dis-
tinguishing between the principle underlying it and the way it is ef-
fected, so that the newspaper can hold its position of being in favour
of the principle, but against the war as a way to achieve this objective.
The same happens in the next example, where the dissociation con-
cerns the concept of ‘‘supporting America’’
(27) Only 19% believe Britain should join America in military action.
Almost the same proportion, 17%, believe that the British government
should publicly condemn America if it takes unilateral action. In between,
a large majority believe Britain should either ‘‘support America diplomati-
cally but not militarily’’ (32%) or else ‘‘distance itself from America but not
condemn it’’ (29%). YouGov’s ﬁndings hint at the possibility that con-
siderable numbers of Britons would like to see America bear the heat of the
day and, with luck, successfully toppling Saddam Hussein, with Britain
remaining comfortably on the sidelines. [S] Telegraph
One of the possible answers to the items of a questionnaire sepa-
rates the notions of diplomatic support and military support to the
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US, thus giving the interviewee a chance to escape the ‘‘pro-war or
pro Saddam’’ moral blackmail, while at the same time solving the con-
tradiction which would come from the decision of denying support to
an ally.
Finally a last example will be discussed, which does not pertain to
any of the two patterns of dissociation use presented so far, but which
is in its own representative of a highly manipulative line of argument
in support of war:
(28) ‘‘These are not people like us,’’ he said of the Iraqi leadership on
Sunday. ‘‘They are not people who abide by the normal rules of human
behaviour’’. [S: Blair] Guardian
Here Blair places the Iraqi leaders outside the domain of humanity,
which is implicitly and in a rather circular fashion redeﬁned as the
community of those who ‘‘abide by the norms of human behaviour’’.
This way of reasoning is in itself potentially dangerous in ethical terms
for the perspectives it could open up, but it also hints at a likewise
dangerous dissociation which pervasively underpinned the pro-war dis-
course, that is the artiﬁcial distinction between Iraqi leaders and Iraqi
people. On this basis the war was massively presented as directed
exclusively against Saddam’s regime, in favour of the Iraqi people.
However, whereas such a distinction might be legitimate if one wanted
to make the point that the majority of the Iraqi population did not
feel represented by Saddam’s regime, it is much less so if used to di-
vert attention from the fact that a war would hit the population as
well as its leadership.
4. CONCLUSIONS
For this paper I set a double aim: from a theoretical point of view I
addressed the issue of the possibility to integrate critical discourse
analysis, with its typically qualitative approach, Corpus linguistics,
which on the other hand relies on quantitative methodology and argu-
mentation theory, which I hypothesized could help to extend the anal-
ysis to higher structures of discourse. On a more operative level, I
applied this model in the analysis of the discourse produced by the
British press in preparation of the war in Iraq, focusing on presuppo-
sitions and dissociations, two discursive structures which have an argu-
mentative potential and at the same time can be retrieved
electronically thanks to the presence of possible indicators.
On this second level the analysis dealt in turn with the two structures,
following essentially a data driven approach, which aimed at highlight-
ing recurrent patterns of use. For what concerns presuppositions, they
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were discussed in relation to the kind of evaluation they express, both of
aﬀective and epistemic nature. While presuppositions of the ﬁrst kind
conﬁrmed that this structure is a good starting point for the analysis of
ideology in discourse, the most interesting results came from presupposi-
tions of the second kind. What emerged is that they were extensively
used to refer to weapons of mass destruction, with the eﬀect that Iraq’s
possession of illegal weapons was generally taken for granted and it
rarely became the focus of explicit argument. Also some fallacies were
identiﬁed, in relation to the use of presuppositions.
For what concerns dissociations, two patterns emerged, which con-
ﬁrmed the highly argumentative potential of this technique. On the
one hand they were used with a critical intent to highlight anomalous
aspects of this war, which responded to new political doctrine of pre-
emptive attack. On the other hand they were used by those who re-
jected the option of war, to defend themselves from the accusation of
being in favour of a brutal regime and of terrorism.
In the light of the results presented in this paper, it can be con-
cluded that corpus linguistics’ tools can be proﬁtably integrated with
critical discourse analysis and argumentation theory into a model for
the analysis of discourse structures.
NOTES
1 The corpus includes both British and Italian newspapers for a total of 800 articles. This paper,
however, takes into account only the British quality newspapers sub-corpus.
2 Both news reports and comment articles form the corpus. The decision of considering both
types of texts was motivated by the belief that this would render a more representative picture of
the discourses produced by the press in the run-up to the war. Apart from that, it seemed in tune
with one of the tenets of critical discourse analysis, i.e. the belief that ideology is implicitly
codiﬁed into linguistic choices, and therefore it is not limited to opinion articles in media
discourse. This was even more so in the period taken into account, since most of news reports
then referred to speeches and statements of politicians, rather than to real events, allowing for a
good amount of opinion expression, either implicitly or explicitly. However the nature of the
articles (comment or report) has never been employed as a variant in the analysis, since they are
not evenly distributed within the corpus. When collecting the corpus, it was decided that the
main criteria for news selection would be chronological, (i.e. articles would be selected at
regular intervals of time), disregarding whether on the established day both reports and com-
ments would be available. Therefore no generalisation can be drawn about the distribution of
linguistic phenomena across the two kinds of texts.
3 My translation.
4 The fact of being ‘‘built into linguistic expressions’’ makes presupposition diﬀerent from
implicature, another form of pragmatic inference, which requires higher cooperation by the
reader in order to be interpreted correctly.
5 Although the notion that non restrictive relative clauses can generate presuppositions is not
undisputed (Lombardi-Vallauri, 2002, p. 24), in this study they are considered presupposition
triggers, resting on Levinson (1983, pp. 181–184).
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6 The three categories are referred to the levels of meaning which can be codiﬁed in text. The
ﬁrst concerns informative content, the second deals with metadiscursive content and the third
with the expression of stance.
7 This is with reference to the rules for critical discussion outlined by van Eemeren et al. (2002,
pp. 109–139). The list includes ten rules, distributed across the four stages of critical discussion,
which should be followed in order to resolve a dispute through valid reasoning according to the
critical discussion model. Any violation of these rules constitutes a fallacy. From this per-
spective, fallacies are redeﬁned in a procedural way, as opposed to the traditional ‘‘moral’’
conception, and their list is systematized.
8 Concordances were extracted automatically for each indicator, and then the output lines were
considered one by one in a traditional way, in order to single out the cases of dissociation. This
process resulted in the elimination of most of the concordance lines, but in some cases tradi-
tional ‘manual’ analysis allowed to identify cases of implicit dissociation which were not sig-
nalled by indicators, but which just happened to be visualised on the concordance list because
they contained the query word, even though such word was not used as an indicator of dis-
sociation in that case.
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